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INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause' is the most fundamental
constitutional protection that property owners have against the
government.2  Its prohibition against the uncompensated taking of
private property is firmly rooted in the common law and historical
1. The "Takings Clause" is the term commonly used to describe that portion of the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, which states: "Nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 1 (2002)
(contrasting the protection afforded under the Takings Clause with that provided under
the Contract Clause and the Due Process Clause).
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legal traditions.3 Yet, in modern times, the interpretation of this
clause has produced a complex, ambiguous, and baffling set of rules.4
Arguably, this inability to formulate a coherent takings jurisprudence
has resulted in Supreme Court decisions that undercut the principles
of fairness and equity that underlie this Bill of Rights guarantee.'
A recent Supreme Court case that exemplifies this state of affairs
is that surrouding the land of Anthony Palazzolo. In 1959, Palazzolo
(through a corporation, Shore Gardens, Inc. ("SGI"), that he and two
associates had formed) purchased a parcel of land in the town of
Westerly, Rhode Island, intending to develop it.6 At the time of the
land's purchase, the relevant restrictions on the property had not
been enacted.7 Two years later, in 1961, Palazzolo acquired his
associates' fractional interests in SGI to become the corporation's
sole owner.' Over the next five years, Palazzolo submitted three
different development proposals9 for the land to the Rhode Island
Division of Harbors and Rivers, all of which were denied.10
Apparently frustrated by these denials, SGI made no additional
development proposals for over a decade. 1
In the meantime, two events of critical importance occurred.12 In
1971, Rhode Island created the Coastal Resources Management
3. GEORGE SKOURAS, TAKINGS LAW AND THE SUPREME COURT: JUDICIAL
OVERSIGHT OF THE REGULATORY STATE'S ACQUISITION, USE AND CONTROL OF
PRIVATE PROPERTY 11 (1998) (tracing the Takings Clause's history to the Magna Carta
and possibly Roman times).
4. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (1967) ("The
courts have developed a bewildering array of rules for determining when [a taking
occurs]."); see also Henry N. Butler, Regulatory Takings After Lucas, REGULATION: THE
CATO REVIEW OF BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT, 1993 No. 3, at 76 (noting that the
Supreme Court has created a "confused and baffling body of law"); David G. Savage, No
Time Outs for the Taking, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2002, at 27 (stating that the Supreme Court has
"failed to set clear rules" for takings cases).
5. Michael M. Berger, The Shame of Planners, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., at 6, 8
(2002).
6. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 613 (2001).
7. Id. at 613-14. SGI purchased the property in 1959, and the relevant restrictions
were passed in 1971. Id.
8. Id. at 613.
9. Proposals were submitted in 1962, 1963, and 1966. Id. at 613-14.
10. The 1962 and 1963 proposals were for a dredge and fill permit while the 1966
proposal was for a beach club. Id. at 614. The 1962 permit was denied because of a lack of
essential information in the proposal and the 1963 and 1966 permits were denied because
of the alleged environmental impact the construction would have caused. Id.
11. Id.
12. These events are of critical importance because the transfer of ownership allowed
the state's transferability defense, and the Council's creation spawned the restrictions on
development. Id.
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Council ("Council") and charged it with protecting the state's coastal
properties. 3  Then, in 1978, SGI's corporate charter was revoked 14
and title to the property devolved to Palazzolo in his personal
capacity.15 Palazzolo, now the owner of the land, renewed his efforts
at developing the property by submitting development proposals in
1983, and again in 1985.16 Both proposals were again rejected. 7
Thus, by 1985, Palazzolo, through SGI and in his personal capacity,
submitted to the authorities in Rhode Island five separate
development plans over twenty-three years. 18 All of those proposals
had been turned down. In fact, by 1985, it became reasonably clear
that any development plan that Palazzolo submitted for this property
would be turned down.19 In essence, Palazzolo purchased this parcel
of land, was forced to hold it with no productive use for over twenty
years, and was not and never would be able to develop it. The value
of the land without the restrictions was estimated to be $3.15
million, 0 yet, without the right to build on the land, that value was
entirely illusory.2'
One might ask whether the State of Rhode Island or the Town
Council in Westerly offered any compensation for Palazzolo's
deprivation, whether they offered to trade him development rights
elsewhere as an exchange, or whether they offered any remuneration
for his being asked to carry this public burden alone. They did not.
Instead, when Palazzolo brought suit22 to enforce his rights, twenty-
seven years after purchasing the land, the government proffered two
defenses for why forcing Palazzolo alone to carry this public burden
13. Id.
14. SGI's corporate charter was revoked for failure to pay corporate income taxes.
Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 614-15.
17. Id.
18. The five proposals were submitted in 1962, 1963, 1966, 1983, and 1985. Id. at 613-
15.
19. Id. at 621 ("With respect to the wetlands on petitioner's property, the Council's
decisions make plain that the agency interpreted its regulations to bar petitioner from
engaging in any filling or development activity on the wetlands .... ).
20. This figure was "derived from an appraiser's estimate as to the value of a 74-lot
residential subdivision." Id. at 616.
21. The property with the restrictions retained a value of approximately $200,000 for
building a single-family residence, representing nearly a ninety-five percent diminution in
the property's value. See id. at 616.
22. The suit was an inverse condemnation action. Id. at 615. An inverse
condemnation suit is one brought by the landowner against a governmental body.where
the land's use is restricted and it appears that the government is not going to bring
eminent domain proceedings to acquire the land. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (7th
ed. 1999).
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was not a "taking" and deserved no compensation: (1) Palazzolo had
no "reasonable expectation" that he would be allowed to build on this
property,23 i.e., he should have known that this might happen; and (2)
that of the approximately twenty acres in his property, he could still
build on two of the acres,24 i.e., the government did not take all his
land, just most of it. This second defense is called the partial/total
dichotomy. Adding insult to injury, although the value of his land if
he were allowed to build on it was estimated to be $3.15 million, the
court implied that it may be an entirely fair exchange (or "just
compensation" in the terms of the Fifth Amendment) merely to allow
Palazzolo a $157,000 tax deduction as total compensation by having
him donate the land to the State of Rhode Island. 5
The state's position, however, is not unusual. These twin
defenses offered by the State of Rhode Island against Palazzolo's
takings claim, that the landowner did not have "reasonable
investment-backed expectations" for the use of property and that the
government did not take all of Palazzolo's land, are the two most
common defenses to takings claims.26 In the case of Palazzolo,
however, Rhode Island also proffered a third defense: that
Palazzolo's acquisition of the property, when he acquired personal
title to the land at the time SGI's corporate charter was revoked, took
place after the enactment of the regulations governing his property;
27
therefore, he had no right to make the claim.28 In other words,
takings claims of previous owners are not transferable to new owners.
When Palazzolo's case reached the United States Supreme Court, the
23. Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
24. See id. at 715. But see Transcript of the University of Hawai'i Law Review
Symposium: Property Rights After Palazzolo, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 455, 464 (2002)
(describing an instance in which an inspector recently visited Palazzolo's property and,
referring to the two-acre parcel, stated that: "[w]e're not going to give you a permit here
[either]").
25. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 715; Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioner at 5, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047)
[hereinafter Amicus Brief]. When the Palazzolo case reached the United States Supreme
Court in the summer of 2001, the Court remanded the case to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court for additional considerations about Palazzolo's "reasonable expectations."
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616.
26. See generally Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (illustrating the defendants' reliance on the above
justifications); Kim v. City of New York, 681 N.E.2d 312 (N.Y. 1997) (holding that
plaintiff's constructive notice of property restrictions affected the investment-backed
expectations and defeated the takings claim).
27. Palazzolo, 746 A.2d. at 716.
28. Id.
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Court accepted Rhode Island's first two arguments, but flatly rejected
the third.29 The Court held that takings claims are, in fact,
transferable to new owners.3"
This Comment will argue that these first two mainstays of takings
jurisprudence, reasonable investment-backed expectations and the
partial/total dichotomy, are incompatible with the transferability of
takings claims announced in Palazzolo.3 Part I of this Comment will
discuss the purpose of the Takings Clause. Part II will examine the
rise of the partial/total dichotomy in takings law and its
incompatibility with transferability. Part III will discuss the
"reasonable investment-backed expectations" analysis used to
evaluate takings claims, and its incompatibility with transferability.
Part IV of this Comment will explore the advantages and
disadvantages of transferability of takings claims. Finally, the
Conclusion of this Comment will discuss subsequent interpretations
of Palazzolo and propose an integrated approach to takings claims
that resolves the conflicts discussed in Parts II-IV.32
29. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
30. Id. Many types of takings claims still are not transferable, even after Palazzolo.
For example, in a direct condemnation action by the government, or a physical invasion of
the property, the right to compensation is not transferable. Id. at 628. Even in the area of
regulatory takings, Palazzolo is not clear as to whether all types of takings are
transferable. For instance, once a landowner has received a final administrative decision
on the restricted use of his land, the implications of Palazzolo may be that the claim is no
longer transferable. Palazzolo merely holds that the claim is transferable prior to the
ripeness of the claim. See Gregory M. Stein, The Effect of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island on
the Role of Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS
ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PERSPECTIVES, 41, 50-57 (Thomas E. Roberts ed., 2002)
[hereinafter TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES].
31. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Expanding the
Protections of the Takings Clause, TRIAL, Sept. 2001, at 70, 70 (describing the Court's
holding in Palazzolo as unequivocally endorsing the transferability of takings claims).
This Comment focuses exclusively on regulatory takings, i.e., where the government
causes such a diminution in property value through regulation that, in effect, the
regulations constitute a covert or implicit taking of property under the Fifth Amendment.
This Comment does not deal with the traditional physical taking of private property by the
government through eminent domain proceedings. For a comprehensive view on physical
takings, see POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 2002); JULIUS L.
SACKMAN & RUSSELL D. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 2002);
William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553
(1972).
32. This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court's regulatory takings decisions in light
of the economic incentives and disincentives that they create for property owners. In
some cases, this Comment argues for overturning precedent in light of the illogical effects
that the decisions have on those affected. For a contrasting perspective on these decisions
from the land use field, see JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS,
LAND USE PLANNING AND CONTROL LAW (1998); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING AND
PLANNING DESKBOOK (2d. ed 2001); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW (4th ed.
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I. THE PURPOSE OF THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
in part: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."33 Alternatively known as the "Eminent Domain
Clause"3  or the "Takings Clause,"35  this clause has been
characterized as a "tacit recognition of a preexisting power"36 of the
government37 to "achieve public ends by taking property from private
parties"38 from time to time. The Takings Clause imposes two
separate requirements on the government.39 First, the "public use
requirement" mandates that property may only be taken for public
use, not private.n Thus, property generally may not be taken from
person A and simply given to person B; instead, it must be used to
1997); EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
(4th ed. 2002). For works taking a more historical view of land use and takings law, see
DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY
THROUGH LAND USE REGULATION (1993); RICHARD PIPES, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM
(1999); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY AND FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND LAND-USE REGULATION (1997).
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 153 (1978).
35. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 611.
36. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241 (1946).
37. The Takings Clause applies to the individual states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 226
(1897).
38. Mark W. Smith, A Congressional Call to Arms: The Time Has Come for Congress
to Enforce the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 295,319 (1996).
39. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 191 (noting the two requirements of the
Takings Clause, namely, the public use and compensation requirements). Federal law is
not the only source of protection against government takings. Over twenty states have
enacted property protection laws that may provide greater protection than the Fifth
Amendment. Steven J. Eagle, Protecting Property from Unjust Deprivations Beyond
Takings: Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, and State Legislation, in TAKING
SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES, supra note 30, at 507, 535. Examples include the Texas
Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act, ch. 517, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3266
(codified as amended at TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2007.001-2007.045 (Vernon 2002)),
which provides for compensation when a government action results in at least a twenty-
five percent diminution in the value of real property, TEX. CODE ANN.
§ 2007.002(5)(B)(ii) (Vernon 2002), and Florida's Bert J. Harris, Jr., Property Rights
Protection Act, ch. 95-181, 1995 Fla. Laws 1651 (codified as amended FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 70.001 (West 2002)), which provides for compensation when government action has
"inordinately burdened" the landowner, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70.001(2) (West 2002).
Additionally, alternative claims might be available to one who believes he is a victim of a
regulatory taking. For a concrete summary of alternatives, including estoppel and vested
rights, see Susan L. Trevarthen, Alternatives to Takings: Procedural Due Process, Equal
Protection, and State Law Doctrine, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKING ISSUES, supra note 30,
at 551.
40. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) ("A purely private taking
could not withstand the scrutiny of the public use requirement ....").
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benefit the general public.41  Second, the "compensation"
requirement states that whenever a taking occurs, there must be
compensation, and that compensation must be just.42
Several justifications for the Takings Clause exist.43 First, the
protection of property rights encourages private investment and leads
to a more prosperous economy. 44 Second, the clause is equitable, in
that no one person or group is forced to bear any burden that should
rightfully be borne by all.45 Third, the compensation requirement
limits the scope of government in that it confines its activities to those
that are primarily public, rather than private or "special interests. 46
Finally, it requires the government to pay for the resources that it
commands, thereby restraining the appetite of government.47  The
41. But see id. at 232 (holding that the forced sale of land from one landowner to a
group of landowners to reduce the evils of a land oligopoly was not a taking); Butler, supra
note 4, at 76 (noting that the "public use" requirement, in fact, has very little bite as a
restriction).
42. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 4. It is significant to note that, unlike the
First Amendment, which begins with the words "Congress shall make no law," U.S.
CONST. amend. I, the Fifth Amendment has no such categorical prohibition, other than
that a taking be for public use, see U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause merely
states the consequences when a taking does occur, namely, that there be just
compensation.
43. For a more thorough discussion of the purposes of the Takings Clause, compare
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 19-29 (1985) (arguing for a broader interpretation of the Takings Clause), with
Matthew P. Harrington, "Public Use" and the Original Understanding of the So-Called
"Takings" Clause, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1245, 1258 (2002) (arguing for a narrower
interpretation of the Takings Clause).
44. Butler, supra note 4, at 76. For example, landowners are more likely to make
investments in developing land when they know that government actions that destroy the
value of that land will require compensation from the government.
45. Id. If government is trying to achieve some public goal, e.g., environmental or
historic preservation, it is fair that the public pays for the resources that help realize that
public purpose.
46. See Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893) ("[I]n
any society the fullness and sufficiency of the securities which surround the individual in
the use and enjoyment of his property constitute one of the most certain tests of the
character and value of the government."); see also Butler, supra note 4, at 76 ("[T]he
public use requirement could limit the scope of government activities to those that involve
primarily public, rather than private (special interest), benefits.").
47. See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 48 (1995) (statement of Roger Pilon,
Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato Institute) (noting the
substantial danger of an increased demand for private parties to bear public burdens that
would arise from ignoring the Takings Clause: "[n]ot every species may be worth
preserving-except of course, if its preservation is free"); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 58 (4th ed. 1992); Butler, supra note 4, at 76 ("[T]he
compensation requirement serves as an important restraint by requiring the government
to pay for all the resources that it commands."). The Takings Clause prevents a vicious
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Court has tended to focus on the second justification, encapsulated by
Justice Holmes who noted in Armstrong v. United States4 that the
purpose of the Takings Clause is to prevent the government from
"forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. 49
Despite this focus, one must remember that other justifications exist
as well, and any takings principle must be judged according to each of
those purposes." It is only in this manner that the full protection of
the Takings Clause can be achieved.
II. THE PARTIAL/TOTAL DICHOTOMY
This Comment will refer to the difference in treatment between
regulations that leave landowners with some use of their property and
regulations that leave owners with no use of their property as the
"partial/total dichotomy."51  Governmental entities commonly use
this dichotomy as a defense to takings claims because most
regulations will fall short of depriving landowners of all use of their
property.52 To understand the rationale for this dichotomy, it is
important to first understand how the distinction arose.
A. Background of the Partial/Total Dichotomy
The framers' concept of a taking was a physical taking, where the
government physically took and occupied private land for public
economic cycle. Generally, when the price of something decreases, the demand tends to
increase. See Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 884-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Williams, J., concurring). Thus, if the price of achieving some public goal by taking
private property is "free," that is, if there was no Takings Clause requiring "just
compensation," then the demand for such actions would increase. Thus, the danger of
ignoring the Takings Clause is palpable-the demand for private parties to bear public
burdens would increase substantially.
48. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
49. Id. at 49.
50. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306,
456-57 (2001) [hereinafter 2000 Term: Leading Cases] (arguing that the reasonableness of
the government's action and the sharing of public burdens are the most important
justifications for the Takings Clause).
51. While the author coined the term "partial/total dichotomy," similar phraseology
has been used in the past. See Karen M. Brunner, A Missed Opportunity: Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island Leaves Investment-Backed Expectations Unclear as Ever, 25 HAMLINE L.
REV. 117, 119 (2001) (referring to the "dichotomy between partial and total takings
analyses"); see also Dist. Intown, 198 F.3d at 886 (noting the Supreme Court's justifications
for its distinction between partial and total takings).
52. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992) (noting that it is
"relatively rare" that a total taking is found).
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use.53 Such physical takings remain the classic case today, and when
the government so exercises its eminent domain power, disputes
about the fact that a taking has occurred seldom arise.54 For instance,
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp.," a condominium
owner was forced to allow cable-television antennas and wires to be
placed on her building. 6 Despite the very minimal intrusion onto the
owner's property, the Court found a taking, even though the antennas
most likely added value to the building. Also, in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,58 the Court found a taking where the
government required a property owner to give up an easement across
his property in exchange for a building permit.5 9 Thus, when the
government occupies any part of an owner's land, a taking occurs and
compensation must be paid.
In addition to a physical taking, the government will be held
liable if it effects a regulatory taking. A regulatory taking is where
the government does not occupy the property, but regulates the
manner in which the owner of the property may use or develop it
such that the property's use or value is diminished.60 The concept of
regulatory takings is said to have begun in 1922 when Justice Holmes,
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,6 wrote that "[t]he general rule at
least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."'62 While it
likely would be administratively impossible for the government to
compensate for every single effect of its regulations, there will
nonetheless be a taking when regulations go too far.
The Supreme Court established the analytical method for
determining whether regulations go "too far" in the landmark case of
53. See id. at 1014 ("Prior to [1922] ... it was generally thought that the Takings
Clause reached only a 'direct appropriation' of property.").
54. See id. at 1015; see also Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49
Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001) (granting summary judgment to plaintiffs whose contractual water
rights were taken in order to meet requirements of the Endangered Species Act).
55. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
56. Id. at 419. New York law required a landlord to let cable companies put
equipment on his property. Id. at 421.
57. Id. The cable television attenas may have added value by making that service
available to the building's tenants. On remand, however, the district court awarded only
$1 in damages to Mrs. Loretto. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1137
(4th ed. 1998).
58. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
59. Id. at 841-42.
60. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct.
1465, 1480-81 (2002).
61. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
62. Id. at 415.
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Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,63 which
involved a building restriction on the famed Grand Central Station in
Manhattan. In that case, the City of New York had designated Grand
Central Station as a historical landmark and prohibited its owners
from erecting an office building in the air space above the station,
despite the fact that an office building was a part of the station's
original design.'
In evaluating the constitutionality of this restriction, the Court
laid out what has become the standard three-part test for determining
whether a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) the economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation
interferes with investment-backed expectations; and (3) the character
of the government action.65 The Court in Penn Central acknowledged
that the consideration of these various factors turns such cases into
"essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,"66 which, in that particular case,
justified the restriction on Grand Central Station with very little
compensation to the owners.67 Because the regulation of Grand
Central Station had not gone too far, the Court held that it was a
permissible government law and not a violation of the Takings
Clause.
Regulatory takings are subdivided into partial and total takings.
For example, in Penn Central, the property had remaining value; after
all, it was an operating train station. The property was put to
productive use, but the use was restricted because the use of the air
rights above the station was prohibited. Thus, this sort of government
action, where part of the property is taken but some value remains, is
known as a "partial" regulatory taking.68 Though the Court did not
find a taking in Penn Central, the three-part test, set out above, is the
test used for all partial regulatory takings cases.
63. 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our polestar ... remains the principles set forth in Penn
Central... [for] partial regulatory takings.").
64. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 115.
65. Id. at 123-24.
66. Id.
67. Id. The owners of buildings subject to historic landmark regulations were,
however, "allowed to transfer development rights to contiguous parcels on the same city
block." Id. at 114. This granting of additional development rights was seen as
compensation for the restrictions on the historic parcel. Id. at 150 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
68. A partial takings claim is a suit for compensation "where an economically viable
use survives [the] regulation." Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (Williams, J., concurring).
2002]
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Unlike partial regulatory takings, a "total" regulatory taking is
one in which the regulations covering the land leave no economically
viable use for the property. Courts use a completely different
methodology for total regulatory takings than they do for partial
regulatory takings. The classic example of this methodology occurred
in the landmark 1992 case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council.69 In Lucas, David Lucas purchased two beachfront lots on
the Isle of Palms, a barrier island off the coast of South Carolina.7"
Shortly after his purchase, the government imposed a regulation that
prohibited him from building any structures on the land, even though
both adjacent parcels of land contained homes.7 Lucas accordingly
filed suit, claiming a Fifth Amendment taking. In reversing the South
Carolina Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, declared that when the
government forces a landowner to give up "all economically
beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking."" Thus, Lucas
established the categorical imperative that if there was a total taking,
then the landowner would be due complete compensation,73 but if
there was less than a total taking, courts would use the Penn Central
"ad hoc, fact-intensive analysis," which typically results in no
compensation.74
The only exception to this categorical imperative for total
regulatory takings occurs when a restriction on the use of property
"inhere[s] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the state's law of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership."75  Thus, if the restriction on the property
comprised part of the "background principles" of state law, there
would be no taking.76 For instance, if a regulation prohibited a
69. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
70. Id. at 1006-07.
71. Id. at 1008-09.
72. Id. at 1019.
73. Upon remand in Lucas, the parties negotiated a settlement, and South Carolina
purchased Lucas's lots for $1.575 million. Carolynne C. White & Gerard G. Alberts, The
Lucas Case and Modern Takings Theory, STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT, Vol. 18, No. 9
(Sept. 1, 1993), at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/esnr/slr931uc.htm (last visited Nov. 22,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
74. See, e.g., Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(Williams, J., concurring) ("[I]n partial takings cases, the government wins."); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1993) (stating that Justice Scalia's approach
will cause partial takings to remain uncompensated).
75. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
76. Id. at 1030.
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landowner from excavating his land to such a degree that the
excavation eliminated the lateral support to his neighbors, that
landowner would not suffer a taking. Additionally, a landowner
would not suffer a taking where he was prevented from using his land
in a way that interfered with the government's navigational
servitude;77 such uses were not part of the title in the first place.78
Restrictions on the use of property that are part of the common
law principles that inhere in the land only duplicate the results that
adjacent landowners can obtain by bringing a nuisance claim or which
the government can obtain by bringing an action under its police
power.79 The crucial aspect of such background principles, however,
is that they cannot be newly legislated; 0 they must be a long-standing
part of the common law, such as restrictions against common law
nuisance. Unless a total regulatory taking falls into this exception,
meaning that the restricted use was not allowed under the
background principles of state property law, then the court will find a
taking.
B. Criticisms of the Partial/Total Dichotomy
In many ways, the partial/total dichotomy, resulting from the
Penn Central and Lucas decisions, makes little sense. First, it is
capricious. As Justice Stevens noted in Lucas, "the Court's new rule
is wholly arbitrary. A landowner whose property is ninety-five
percent diminished in value recovers nothing, while an owner whose
property is one hundred percent diminished recovers the land's full
value."'" In fact, one landowner's noncompensable partial taking may
be a much larger dollar loss than another landowner's compensable
total taking. For example, a partial restriction on property resulting
in a multi-million dollar loss of value will result in no compensation,
but a total restriction on land resulting in only a few thousand dollars
77. A "navigation servitude" is an easement that the federal government possesses,
based upon its Commerce Clause power, to regulate commerce on navigational waters in
the United States. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1051 (7th ed. 1999); see Palm Beach Isles
Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1381-86 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (finding that the
"navigational servitude may constitute part of the 'background principles' to which a
property owner's rights are subject, and thus may provide the Government with a defense
to a takings claim"), aff'd, 231 F.3d.
78. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
79. Id. at 1029; cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 145
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The nuisance exception to the taking guarantee is not
coterminous with the police power itself."). The nuisance exception encompasses only
those police power actions that a state could bring under common law nuisance.
80. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028.
81. Id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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loss of value will result in total compensation, even if the properties
are right next door to each other. This leads to an ironic result where
owners may prefer to have their land's use totally destroyed, rather
than only partially hindered.82
A second criticism of the partial/total dichotomy is that the
distinction conflicts with precedent. The Supreme Court, on many
occasions, has treated partial deprivations of property as fully
compensable. For example, in Causby v. United States,83 the federal
government leased a small airport. As a result, planes flew within one
hundred feet of the plaintiff's home, thus restricting the landowner's
use of property because of noise, vibrations, and fear for personal
safety. The Court found a compensable taking in the form of an
easement that required compensation, even though many uses of the
land remained available to the plaintiff.84 Again, in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,85
a county ordinance temporarily prohibited the plaintiff from
rebuilding on his property after a flood had destroyed the prior
building occupying the land. The Court found that a "temporary"
taking had occurred and ordered compensation. 86 In Jacobs v. United
States,87 a group of farmers sued the federal government for the
occasional flooding of their lands, alleging that the government-
constructed dam caused the flooding. The Court found "a partial
taking of the lands for which the Government was bound to make just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment."88
While there is ample precedent that partial interruptions in the
use of, and diminutions in the value of, property are fully
compensable under the Fifth Amendment, this line of reasoning is
not without fault. As in Loretto,89 the situations in Causby and Jacobs
are both physical takings whereby the government caused actual
occupation of the plaintiffs' land. In Causby, approaching planes
occupied the low airspace above the land, while in Jacobs, floodwater
82. See Epstein, supra note 74, at 1377 (critiquing Justice Scalia's approach in Lucas
because it allows no compensation for partial takings).
83. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
84. Id. at 267; see also Griggs v. Allegheney County, 369 U.S. 84, 90 (1962) (finding a
compensable taking when the local county took an air easement over plaintiff's property
for landing at an airport).
85. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
86. Id. at 322.
87. 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
88. Id. at 16.
89. For discussion of "physical" takings, see supra notes 53-59 and accompanying
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covered the plaintiff's land. Because they were physical takings, the
Court treated these cases differently from partial regulatory takings.
Making an exception for physical takings makes little sense, however,
because a restriction on land use often has the same effect as a
physical taking. For example, it would not have made any difference
to the farmers in Jacobs had the government simply prohibited the
use of that portion of the land that was flooded.9" In either scenario,
the diminution in value of the farmer's lands is identical. Because
"[i]t is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure of
the value of the property taken,"'" it should make no difference
whether the government is obtaining a value from the use of the land
or is simply preventing the landowner from doing something of which
the government disapproves. The measure of value is in accordance
with what the landowner has given up.92 Thus, a determination of
whether a taking has occurred should also be viewed from the
standpoint of the landowner. Given the precedent established above
for fully compensating partial takings to the extent of the value
taken,93 and that the standard for viewing this loss is from the
perspective of the landowner,94 all takings that are identical from the
landowner's point of view should be compensated equally. By this
reasoning, the partial/total dichotomy should be overturned, with
courts compensating all takings, regardless of the extent or nature of
their intrusion.
Having established that the partial/total dichotomy is at odds
with precedent, because in the past numerous partial deprivations of
property have been compensated, a third criticism is that the
90. Justice Stevens has stated that the justification for the differing treatment of
physical and regulatory takings comes from the text of the Fifth Amendment itself,
because it is obvious when property is physically taken, but not when property is taken by
excessive regulations. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
122 S. Ct. 1465, 1478 n.17 (2002). In Lucas, Justice Scalia made no distinction between
physical and regulatory takings because he looked at the regulation from the point of view
of the landowner. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). When the
regulation was equivalent to a physical occupation, from the landowner's point of view,
compensation was due. Id. at 1017-18. Justice Brennan has noted that "[flrom the
property owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his land is condemned ... or
restricted in use by regulation." San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
652 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Tahoe-Sierra, Justice Stevens limited this
equivalence theory to situations where there is exact equivalence. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct.
at 1480 n.19.
91. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
92. Id. at 375 ("[T]he owner is to receive no more than indemnity for his loss.").
93. See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
94. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
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dichotomy conflicts with the text of the Constitution itself.95 The
Fifth Amendment does not say, "Nor shall private property be taken
for public use unless the owner is left with some property." The text
simply says that what is taken must be compensated.96 No textual
basis exists for concluding that compensation is due only in the
context of total takings. While a lack of textual support further
indicates that the partial/total dichotomy needs reformulation, it must
be conceded, however, that the original intent of the Takings Clause
was limited to instances of eminent domain, where the government
physically took and occupied property.97 The idea that the Takings
Clause applied to government regulation was not propounded until
the early twentieth century.9" The amount of regulation that exists
today, however, is mammoth in comparison to that existing in the
eighteenth century,99 and interpreting the Takings Clause to
encompass regulatory takings is consistent with viewing the
Constitution as a "living document""1 ° that interprets constitutional
principles in light of their application to modern events.
Fourth, the partial/total distinction is inconsistent with another
purpose of the Takings Clause, which is to restrain the appetite of
government. 1 After Lucas, it is unlikely that any state legislature
95. It should be noted, however, that the intention of some of the framers of the
Constitution specifically did not agree with the concept of "regulatory takings." Id. at
1028. A textual approach thus may be a weak argument in favor of expanding the
definition of regulatory takings. See generally William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782,
798-818 (1995) (arguing that modern takings jurisprudence exemplifies a disregard for the
framers' intent).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
97. DANA & MERRILL, supra note 2, at 4 (discussing the original meaning of the
Takings Clause).
98. Id. But see Kris W. Kobach, The Origins of Regulatory Takings: Setting the
Record Straight, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1211, 1218 (1996) (arguing that regulatory takings
law began long before the twentieth century).
99. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1142 (1995) (noting the recent "avalanche of
federal environmental legislation"). But see WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY
TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 80 (1995) (noting that regulations infringing
on property rights were common in the late colonial period).
100. See Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What is?, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 9, 14 (1995) (discussing the
"living document" theory of interpretation).
101. See Epstein, supra note 74, at 1391 (noting the possibility of using the Takings
Clause "as a welcome restraint on the appetite of government"). Lucas provides a clear
example of this restraint. After the case was remanded, the State of South Carolina
decided to purchase Lucas's property from him. Then, as the new property owner, South
Carolina decided to offer the lots for sale for residential purposes. See Butler, supra note
4, at 81.
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will ever institute a regulation that will take all of a landowner's
property, which will require full compensation, when only taking
ninety-five percent of the property will not require compensation.
Instead of acting as a restraint on the growth of government, the
partial/total dichotomy only encourages the expansion of
government. Professor Richard Epstein noted that "the Court has
provided an effective blueprint for confiscation that budget-conscious
state legislators will be eager to follow to the letter."'12 In effect, we
may have witnessed the last regulatory taking, at least according to
the Lucas definition, but as Palazzolo illustrates, not the last intrusion
on property rights.0 3
A final problem with the partial/total dichotomy is pragmatic:
the dichotomy encourages lower courts to follow the antithesis of the
model, that is, it allows courts to ignore Penn Central and find no
compensable taking whenever there is less than a total taking.
According to Penn Central, a partial regulatory taking is compensable
if it meets the three-part test which evaluates (1) the economic impact
on the claimant, (2) the interference with investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the invasion.0 4 But, in practice,
courts rarely find partial regulatory takings.0 5 The simple Lucas
formulation that treats a total deprivation as a taking encourages
courts to infer the negative implication of that rule0 6 and find no
taking unless there is a total loss of use. The Lucas formulation
provides "an attractive bright line rule for lower court judges"'0 7 but it
is not consistent with the thrust of Penn Central, which is that partial
takings deserve compensation.0 8
This role reversal demonstrates that actions that may appear to be in the public
interest when they are 'free'-that is, when the political decision makers don't
bear the costs-are not necessarily attractive government programs once the
political decision makers must bear the budgetary costs of their actions. It is
difficult to find a better example of how protection for owners of private
property serves to restrain the growth of government.
Id.
102. Epstein, supra note 74, at 1377; see Butler, supra note 4, at 79 (stating that Lucas
"creates a clear road map for ... legislators.., to avoid regulatory takings claims").
103. Butler, supra note 4, at 79.
104. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
105. For discussion on regulatory takings, see supra notes 60-67 and accompanying
text.
106. Butler, supra note 4, at 79.
107. Id.
108. Part of the reason that no taking was found in Penn Central is that the landowner
had received development rights as partial compensation. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 122.
2002]
408 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
C. The Denominator Problem
The difference in treatment between partial and total regulatory
takings engenders its own difficulty, known as the "denominator
problem."'19 First mentioned in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis,"0 the denominator problem involves determining "the
unit of property whose value is to furnish the denominator of the
fraction" of what was taken. 1 In other words, if the denominator is
only that part of the property that has been affected by regulations,
then the fraction of the property affected by regulation will equal one,
and there will have been a total, and thus compensable, taking. In
Lucas, Justice Scalia spelled out the problem:
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we would analyze this situation as one in which the
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the
owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as
a whole. 12
109. Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)), affd,
231 F.3d 1354; see also Raymond R. Coletta, The Measuring Stick of Regulatory Takings:
A Biological and Cultural Analysis, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 20, 55-62 (1998) (discussing the
issue of whether a court should focus on the "value remaining" or the "value taken"). See
generally Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS
L.J. 663 (1996) (describing the denominator problem as it relates to regulatory takings).
The problem is also known as the question of the relevant parcel, the non-severance rule,
or the non-segmentation rule. Transcript of the University of Hawai'i Law Review
Symposium: Property Rights After Palazzolo, supra note 24, at 466.
110. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
111. Id. at 497.
112. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992); see also Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (noting the existence of the "persisting question of
what is the proper denominator in the takings fraction"); Coletta, supra note 109, at 59
(noting the fact that "courts have for so long failed to reach a consensus on this issue [is an
illustration] that hidden complexities and strong emotions are an integral part of the
regulatory takings arena"). Property may also be divided in ownership temporally (as in
leases or remainder interests), vertically (as in air rights or surface rights), or by usage
(such as residential zoning). The Court has answered the denominator problem, as it
relates to temporal property rights, by disallowing division in regulatory takings. Tahoe
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483 (2002); see
also infra notes 131-36 and accompanying text. The Court has also answered the
denominator problem as it relates to vertical division of property, by disallowing division
in regulatory takings. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506
(1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 115 (1978). The Court
has sent mixed signals on the denominator issue for the functional division of property.
Compare Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 (1987) (implying that the function of devising
property can be divided from other functions), with Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67-68
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The facts of District Intown Properties, Ltd. v. District of
Columbia"' illustrate the crucial task of identifying the denominator
in takings cases. In District Intown, the government designated an
apartment complex in Washington, D.C., as a historical landmark,
thereby restricting its development."4  The apartment owner also
owned a vacant parcel of land next to the apartment building and
submitted applications for building permits for the vacant land.1"5
When the permits were denied, the landowner filed a takings claim.
The court in District Intown considered the "relevant parcel" to be
both of the lots combined." 6 The court went on to hold that a taking
did not occur because the vacant lot added to the value of the
apartment building"7 and there was not a denial of all "economically
viable use."' 18 In other words, the court held the denominator to be
all of District Intown's property."9 But if the court had determined
the denominator to be only the vacant parcel, then compensation
would have been due. Thus, defining the "relevant parcel" is
essentially the entire question for determining whether a taking has
occurred. 12 0
Palazzolo once again resolved the denominator question to the
detriment of the landowner. 2' Although the government had
prohibited Palazzolo from building on eighteen acres out of his
twenty-acre parcel, and the Court mentioned the denominator
problem,'22 the Court' did not find a Lucas taking because the
remaining two acres retained "significant worth."'23
Not all cases work to the detriment of the landowner as do
District Intown and Palazzolo, however. In Palm Beach Isles
(1979) (holding that the function of selling property will not be severed from other
functions).
113. 198 F.3d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
114. Id. at 876.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 885.
117. The court held that the vacant lot added to the aesthetic value of the apartment
complex. It may be noted that courts can always attribute an aesthetic value to adjacent
land. Thus, a landowner of adjacent property will more often than not lose a takings claim
on the former view. Id. at 888-89 (Williams, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 885.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 881-82 (noting that once the district court answered the denominator
question, its summary judgment on the takings claim was "unremarkable").
121. Palazzolo owned twenty acres of property, only two of which were usable after the
regulation. The Court found the denominator to be the entire twenty acres, instead of just
the affected eighteen acres. See supra notes 6-25 and accompanying text.
122. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001).
123. Id. at 632.
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Associates v. United States,24 for example, a group of investors
purchased 311.7 acres of land on a barrier island from the State of
Florida in 1956. The parcel was bounded on one side by the Atlantic
Ocean and on the other side by a small lake, and a road bisected the
length of the property. Twelve years after the purchase, the owners
sold off the land on the Atlantic side of the road, constituting 261 of
the acres, for over $1 million. The owners held the remaining 50.7
acres, which primarily consisted of submerged wetlands, with
development in mind. In 1972, the land became subject to restricted
development under the Clean Water Act,125 and the government
denied previously accepted development plans. Considering the
landowner's takings claim for the remaining 50.7 acres, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that the two
parcels were distinct. 126 Factors influencing the court included that
there was a road separating the parcels, they were not part of the
same original development plan, and the parcels had different
physical characteristics. 27 Having thus identified the relevant parcel,
the court found a taking. 128
Courts have developed a variety of methods for determining the
relevant parcel. "The factors considered are: (1) whether the
neighboring parcels are contiguous, (2) whether they were acquired
simultaneously, (3) whether they have been treated as a single unit,
and (4) the extent to which the restricted lot benefits the neighboring
lot."' 29  Despite these criteria, determining the relevant parcel
remains difficult. 130
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 3 the Court took its most significant step toward solving the
denominator problem. Addressing whether a thirty-two month
124. 231 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2000), modifying 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
125. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997)).
126. Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 231 F.3d at 1364.
127. The parcel to the east was beachfront property fronting the Atlantic Ocean and
the parcel to the west was marshland and submerged property in Lake Worth.
128. The case was remanded to determine if a navigational servitude on the land
existed, which would make the takings claim moot. Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 231 F.3d at
1365.
129. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J.,
concurring).
130. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (calling the
denominator issue a "difficult, persisting question"); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992) (characterizing it as a "difficult question").
131. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
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moratorium on development was a per se taking of property, 13 2 the
Court held that the proper analysis was to consider the property as a
whole, and not to disaggregate the fee interest into temporal slices.133
Because the Court found that the moratorium affected only a small
portion of the property, the short temporal interest, the Court easily
rejected a Lucas taking."3 Although the Tahoe-Sierra decision only
involved the denominator problem in a temporal context,13 s and thus
is only controlling in that context, the decision generally endorses the
"parcel as a whole" doctrine.'36 That may indicate an approaching
consensus to viewing all of the landowner's holdings as comprising
the denominator in takings cases.
Even if the parcel as a whole doctrine becomes the standard view
of property for takings purposes, it is not without problems.'37 One
such problem is that the rule breeds inefficient land transactions.' If
a different party owned the vacant parcel of land in District Intown,
the Lucas rule would produce a taking because the entire value of the
parcel would be eliminated. In Palazzolo, if only the wetlands had
been purchased originally, or if the uplands had been sold off shortly
after purchase, the Lucas rule would result in a compensable taking.
The parcel-as-a-whole doctrine thus encourages landowners to
engage in inefficient transactions, such as purchasing and holding land
in smaller size lots, setting up needless joint ventures and subsidiary
corporations, or putting the smaller parcels in the name of a relative
or friend. 139 The parcel as a whole doctrine also discriminates against
those with larger landholdings and those who happen to concentrate
132. Id. at 1470.
133. Id. at 1483. A temporal slice of property would be any temporal ownership in
property less than the fee, e.g., a leasehold, life estate, term of years, etc.
134. Id. at 1484.
135. Id. at 1483-84.
136. Id.; see also Thomas E. Roberts, A Takings Blockbuster and a Triumph for
Planning, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., at 4,5-6 (2002).
137. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling the parcel as a
whole doctrine a "questionable rule" and referring to the Court's acceptance of it as
"puzzling").
138. See John E. Fee, Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1552 (1994). Professor Fee gives the following example: Imagine five
empty identical beachfront lots alongside one another. Suppose that four of them were
owned by persons who had homes elsewhere, and the fifth lot was owned by someone
living in a lot immediately behind her oceanfront parcel. If a new regulation prohibited
building on all five lots, the first four likely would receive compensation, but the fifth
would not, even though they are identical. Id.
139. By subdividing land in this manner, an owner increases the chance that any
burdensome regulation will affect an entire individual parcel, thus denying the owner all
economically viable use of the land and requiring full compensation from the government.
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those holdings in a particular area. There is simply no reason that the
Takings Clause should offer less protection to someone with more
property than someone with less property, as under the parcel as a
whole doctrine.
D. Transferability is Inconsistent with the Partial/Total Dichotomy
In addition to the internal inconsistency and doctrinal confusion
of the partial/total dichotomy, Palazzolo provokes another criticism.
Because Palazzolo held that the post-regulation acquisition of
property is not a bar to a takings claim,14 this holding may offer
landowners some relief from the partial/total dichotomy. In other
words, Palazzolo simply could have sold off the eighteen acres of
property that were subject to the wetlands restriction and allowed the
subsequent owner to bring a Lucas claim for that parcel. 41
If a takings claim depends on how broadly or narrowly one
defines the affected property interest, and in many instances the
transfer of ownership is not a bar to making a claim, owners could
creatively buy, sell, and deed land to isolate the restricted parcel in a
single lot. If a total takings claim always is compensable, with few
exceptions, and a partial taking will rarely be compensated,
landowners have a significant incentive to hold title in such a way as
to be able to make a total takings claim.
For example, if a landowner has ten acres of land, seven of which
are burdened by a regulation that likely prohibits development of
them, while the remaining three can be freely built upon, the
landowner will not be able to make a total taking claim based upon
the entire ten acres.'42 If the landowner, however, can sell the
burdened seven acres to a new party, then the new owner will possess
seven acres of economically idle land for which the owner will be able
to make a total takings claim.
The preceding example depends upon the transferability of a
takings claim, that such a claim is one of the rights that accompany
land ownership and (absent a contrary agreement between the
parties) is passed on to the new owner. Transferability, as upheld in
Palazzolo, undercuts the partial/total dichotomy. No landowner,
140. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001).
141. It also may have been possible for Palazzolo to sell off the two acres and bring a
claim on the remaining eighteen, although courts may be suspicious of such strategic
behavior. For factors courts use in determining the relevant parcel, see supra note 129 and
accompanying text. Clearly, the timing of the transaction will determine whether such a
transfer will work (e.g., a post-ripeness claim may not work). See supra note 30.
142. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
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properly advised of the current law, would ever make a partial takings
claim when a far more viable total takings claim may be made. This
can be done by transferring the ownership of a portion of the land
and consolidating ownership so that one owner can make a total
takings claim. Although in Palazzolo, the Court seemed not to have
foreclosed consideration of the denominator issue, when transfer of
the property is feasible,143 owners may be better off in dividing the
property and making a total takings claim of the affected portion.144
A likely response to this analysis is that the Takings Clause is
primarily concerned with "justice and fairness, ' 145 and that a
transaction designed to circumvent the law would not deserve
compensation under a constitutional provision with this purpose. The
Takings Clause, however, is designed to secure justice for the
individual landowner, partly by limiting the government's reach into
private individuals' affairs. 146 And, justice dictates that society must
pay for the benefits that it receives by restricting development on
land, rather than saddling the single owner with the entire burden.
E. Advantages of the Partial/Total Dichotomy
Given all of the problems with the partial/total dichotomy and its
illogical results, one might inquire into its historical roots. Professor
Epstein postulates an answer:
It seems evident that [the Court] resorted to this wholly
artificial distinction to avoid having to attack zoning (not to
mention rent control) head on-including the zoning that
existed on the Isle of Palms when Lucas purchased his land.
After all, zoning is, quite simply, a system of partial
restrictions on land use, which would be routinely subject to
intense constitutional scrutiny if the total/partial distinction
in Lucas is abandoned.147
143. In Palazzolo, the Court, although it mentioned the unresolved nature of the
denominator issue, stated that petitioner claimed the entire twenty acres (including the
upland portion) as the basis for his Lucas claim and therefore the Court would not
consider, sua sponte, revising the denominator to include only the encumbered eighteen
acres. Id. Despite this, the Court indicated that had petitioner claimed only the burdened
portion of the land as the denominator of his claim, that it was at least possible that only
the burdened portion would have been so considered. Id.
144. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (mentioning the difficulty of a partial
takings claim).
145. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978)); see also Michelman, supra note 4, at
1172 (proposing that the proper test for compensability is "fairness").
146. 2000 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 50, at 455.
147. Epstein, supra note 74, at 1388 (citation omitted).
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Indeed, the government cannot reasonably be expected to
compensate every diminution in the value of a person's property that
results from government regulation.148 If, for example, during a water
shortage the government prohibits watering of lawns except on every
other day, the government should not expend resources to pay for
every brown lawn. But to say that trifling losses should not be
compensable is different from saying that only total losses are
compensable. There is a large area in between, an area where many
takings cases lie. As the law stands today, many landowners are
forced to be the sole bearers of the burden that the Takings Clause
says should rightfully be borne by the public as a whole.'49
III. INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS
The second common defense to takings claims is that the owner
of the property has no "investment-backed expectations"'5 ° for using
the property in the manner prohibited by regulation."' For instance,
in Palazzolo, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that because
Palazzolo acquired the property after the government enacted the
regulations barring development of his land, he could not have had
any "investment-backed expectations" that he would be allowed to
build on his land. 152
The concept of investment-backed expectations has great appeal
as a tool for determining which takings claims are legitimate.
Investment-backed expectations correspond to one of the purposes of
the Takings Clause, to protect and encourage private investment.'53 If
no private investment-backed expectations for a particular use of land
exist, then the prohibition of that use seems more reasonable and less
of a hindrance on the property owner's business and investment.
For example, if one purchases a beachfront lot in a residential
neighborhood, one likely has investment-backed expectations of
being able to build a residence on that land and live in that residence.
148. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922) (noting that the government
could hardly go on if it was required to compensate for every diminution in property).
149. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
150. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 105 (1978)
(incorporating the "investment-backed expectations" as a criterion for takings claims);
Michelman, supra note 4, at 1213 (proposing the concept of "investment-backed
expectations" in 1967 as a criterion for evaluating takings claims).
151. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 717 (R.I. 2000) (noting that
regulations preventing wetland fill were in place at the time the plaintiff acquired the
land), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying note 44.
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One likely does not have expectations of using the land to construct a
hazardous waste dump. In this simple analysis, the concept of
investment-backed expectations makes sense.154
As applied in Penn Central, for example, the Court held that the
restriction on building an office tower above Grand Central Station
was not a taking because it allowed the owners their expected use of
the property.'55 The Court noted that the historic preservation law
"does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's
primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel." '56 The Court
believed the primary use was a train terminal with limited concession
and office space."' More importantly, Penn Central was allowed to
earn a "reasonable return" '158 on the use of the property. In essence,
the Court found that Penn Central was able to use the terminal for its
"intended purposes" and, therefore, no taking occurred.159
A. Expectations of Government Regulation
While the term "investment-backed expectations" originated in
Penn Central to describe the landowner's expected use of the
property, subsequent cases expanded the term significantly beyond
this conception, upholding multifarious deprivations of property
that-in some sense of the word-might be "expected." The
fountainhead of this expansion is the "background principles"
exception to takings enunciated in Lucas.0'6  According to Lucas,
when an alleged taking is no more than a pre-existing limitation
inhering in the title, no taking will be found. 6' But the key is that
Lucas held that such pre-existing limitations were the same as those
limitations found under the law of private and public nuisance and
154. Of course, if one's expectations for the use of the property would constitute a
nuisance, or other use of property that is not part of the "background principles" of law
governing the property, that use can be prevented, even without compensation. See Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). But, absent a use that could be so
curtailed, a landowner's expectations are protected under this concept. Id.
155. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (noting
that plaintiff's ability to obtain a "sufficient return" on its property was a factor in denying
the takings claim).
159. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 138.
160. See R.S. Radford & J. David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island Clarify the Murky Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory
Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 449, 472-78 (2001).
161. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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the law of necessity. 62 Courts, however, have ignored this caveat and
have treated any previously-enacted legislation or regulatory regime
as a "background principle."1 63
In District Intown, 64 for example, the court held that the
plaintiffs had no reasonable investment-backed expectations for
building apartments on their property because the land was "subject
to an existing regulatory regime"1 65 that the plaintiffs should have
reasonably expected might prohibit such use. While District Intown
cites Lucas for such a proposition, prohibiting an apartment building
to preserve public values relating to national parks 166 is not something
that can be achieved through the courts under the laws of nuisance or
necessity, as required by Lucas. 67  District Intown thus conflated
"background principles" with any law that the government might pass
at any time. t68 After District Intown, if a governmental regulatory
regime exists, a landowner likely will not succeed in a takings claim
because the landowner should expect that the government might
prohibit a particular use of the property. In this respect, District
Intown is not unusual.
In Kalorama Heights Partnership v. District of Columbia,69 a
developer purchased a building in Washington D.C., intending to tear
down the current structure and build condominiums in its place. 7'
The building, which at one time housed the French Embassy, had
been vacant for five years and had deteriorated. 7' The new owner's
applications for a permit and variance, however, were denied because
the area was subsequently designated a historical district.'72 When
the owner filed suit, the court held that the owner had no reasonable
investment-backed expectations for development of its property
162. Id.
163. See Radford & Breemer, supra note 160, at 480-82.
164. For the facts of District Intown, see supra text accompanying notes 113-19.
165. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
166. Id. at 877.
167. See Radford & Breemer, supra note 160, at 472.
168. In other words, the government could pass legislation at any time that would
become a background principle. But, as Lucas noted, background principles cannot be
"newly legislated." Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992). The court
in District Intown stated that if the authority of the Commission on Fine Arts was "not
sufficient [to establish expectations of a regulatory regime], after 1979, D.C.'s historic
landmark laws additionally limited expectations of development." Dist. Intown, 198 F.3d
at 883.
169. 655 A.2d 865 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
170. Id. at 867.
171. Id. at 867 n.1.
172. Id. at 867-68.
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because it should have been aware of "strong preservationist trends in
the area."'73
In Mock v. Department of Environmental Resources,17 4 the
Mocks owned a parcel of land that fronted a main traffic artery in a
commercially zoned area where all of the adjacent properties had
been developed."' 5 They wanted to "fill .87 acres of wetlands on their
property" to construct an auto service shop, in an area where such
shops were permitted by ordinance. 76 In upholding the denial of a
permit to construct the shop, the court held that while the Mocks had
not presented evidence of their reasonable expectations for the
property,177 the court stated that "expectations are reasonable only if
they take into account the power of the state to regulate property for
the public interest.' ' 78  While, arguably, Mock is correctly decided
because the Mocks failed to show that other uses of the property that
were equally valuable did not exist,'179 the idea that investment-backed
expectations include any regulation that the government may pass
suggests no limiting principle. Thus, if government regulation is in
any sense expected, then the landowner will have no defense when
government regulation appears. In the extreme, this theory
undercuts the Fifth Amendment protections. 180
B. Criticisms of Investment-Backed Expectations
The first criticism of the investment-backed expectations analysis
is that it is unclear why a landowner's expectations are relevant to the
takings calculus at all. If someone purchases Texas farmland
expecting to build a ranch to raise cattle, but then discovers oil on the
land, this discovery is certainly not in accordance with the person's
expectations. But it would seem beyond the pale for the government
to take the oil without compensation, simply because the landowner
did not expect to find the oil on the property. Indeed, such would be
the case for any unexpected result from the land-whether it is
finding a deposit of gold or diamonds, or the rapid and unexpected
173. Id. at 872 (discussing that the counsel knew that the owners were aware that there
was only a fifty percent chance of obtaining zoning variance).
174. 623 A.2d 940 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993), affd, 667 A.2d 212 (Pa. 1995).
175. Id. at 942.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 949.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See generally Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. L.
REV. 533 (2002) (stating that the notice rule leads to a "vicious circuity" whereby one's
rights become only what the state says they are).
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appreciation in the value of the property. In fact, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit has noted that "[t]he expectations of
the individual, however well- or ill-founded, do not define for the law
what are that individual's compensable property rights."'81  The
Supreme Court has indeed held that the amount of compensation that
must be paid to a landowner in a takings claim is not determined
solely by the use to which the landowner put the property.18 2 Instead,
the compensable value also depends upon a "just consideration of all
the uses for which it is suitable." '83  If compensation for land is
determined irrespective of expectations, then the determination of
whether to find a taking should be made irrespective of expectations
as wellY8
4
Such a principle is just because it allocates the risk and the
reward to the same party. The government will not, in most cases,
compensate landowners for unmet expectations, such as farmland
that produces less than planned or oilfields that run dry.8 5 The risk of
making a worse bargain than expected accompanies the potential
windfall; owners possess both the risk and the reward. But, by
limiting the landowners' "taking" rights to only the expected uses of
the property, the government removes the potential upside of the
property from the landowner, leaving only the downside. For
instance, the landowner would bear the costs of any natural disaster
but would lose any upside potential, such as a rise in price due to a
change in zoning. Such a framework is at odds with the constitutional
demand of "just compensation."
The second criticism of investment-backed expectation analysis
is that the conception is essentially meaningless. When one
deconstructs the phrase, it is apparent that the term "investment-
181. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
182. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
183. Id.
184. The discussion in supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text indicates that there is
an equivalence between physical and regulatory takings from the perspective of the
landowner. This reasoning has been the impetus for treating regulatory takings like
physical takings. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992). But
this equivalence argument is not intended to instill subjectivity into the takings analysis,
rather it is merely to demonstrate the inconsistency in treating physical and regulatory
takings differently; cf Epstein, supra note 74, at 1374 n.25 (noting the difficulty in
distinguishing regulatory from physical takings in certain contexts). Thus, this does not
conflict with the advocacy of an objective analysis relating to expectations, which holds
that the landowner's expectations at the time of purchase are not relevant in the takings
calculus. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
185. See Olson, 292 U.S. at 255 ("The public may not by any means confiscate the
benefits, or be required to bear the burden, of the owner's bargain.").
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backed" is a misnomer, as no real investment is required; donees and
devisees are as equally protected by the Takings Clause. 86 People
also purchase property for a variety of reasons other than investment
(to preserve it in its natural state, for example) and thus the phrase
ends up as merely "expectations." Courts have expanded this phrase
to "reasonable expectations," to add some objectivity to the phrase,187
but what constitutes a reasonable expectation for the use of land
certainly is not obvious. 88 In practice, the phrase limits the intended
function of the Takings Clause and permits virtually any regulation of
property.18 9
C. Transferability Conflicts with Investment-Backed Expectations
Aside from the general criticisms of the investment-backed
expectations analysis, such analysis is particularly problematic
because it conflicts with the transferability of takings claims. The
transferability of takings claims was implicit in the case of Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission9 ' and then made explicit in
Palazzolo.9'
In Nollan, a husband and wife sought a permit to demolish a
small home that they owned on the California coast and to build a
larger home in its place. The California Coastal Commission
("Commission") required that the Nollans grant the city an
easement 192 in exchange for granting them a building permit. Even
though the Commission had begun requiring easements of other
nearby landowners'93 before the Nollans acquired their property, thus
putting the Nollans on notice that this might happen, the Supreme
186. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635 (2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
("We also have never held that a takings claim is defeated simply on account of the lack of
a personal financial investment by a post-enactment acquirer of property, such as a donee,
heir, or devisee."); see also Epstein, supra note 74, at 1370 (noting that an investment is
not required for investment-backed expectations).
187. Radford & Breemer, supra note 160, at 460.
188. To see that the potential value of land is not obvious, look at the swampland that
became Disney World and the deserted mining town that became Aspen.
189. Dist. Intown Props, Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J.,
concurring).
190. 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1986). The taking in Nollan occurred after the Nollans
acquired the property. While the California Coastal Commission had announced a policy
of conditioning permits upon the grant of an easement and was generally conditioning
permits in this manner, there was no requirement that the Commission do so. Thus, until
the Nollan's permit was so conditioned, there was not a taking, Id. at 829.
191. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
192. The easement would allow people to walk along the beach property that the
Nollans owned. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
193. The easements were given in exchange for building permits. Id.
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Court held that the Commission's actions constituted a taking.194
Thus, although the Nollans could reasonably be said to have
"expected" the regulation, they were not bound by it as they acquired
all rights, including any potential takings claim, that the previous
owner possessed. 195  Under this conception, what room does
investment-backed expectations have in the analysis?
Even if the Nollan rule did not apply, it is difficult to understand
how investment-backed expectations would apply to transfers of
property. Different owners will likely have entirely different
expectations relating to a particular piece of realty. 196 By the time
land has been transferred several times, there will have been a variety
of expectations concerning the land. And because everyone is
entitled to the same constitutional protections, it is unhelpful to
consider such expectations in a takings calculus.
IV. TRANSFERABILITY OF TAKINGS CLAIMS
While the transferability of takings claims was implicit in
Nollan,197 it became explicit in Palazzolo'9s where the Court held that
such claims can be transferred from one owner to another. 99 In
Palazzolo, Rhode Island argued that Palazzolo's claim was barred
because he acquired his land after the enactment of the regulation
that prohibited filling the wetlands and, thus, he was "on notice" that
he could not build on that part of the land."°° The United States
Supreme Court flatly rejected that rule:
Were we to accept the State's rule, the post-enactment
transfer of title would absolve the State of its obligation to
defend any action restricting land use, no matter how
extreme or unreasonable. A State would be allowed, in
effect, to put an expiration date on the Takings Clause. This
ought not to be the rule. Future generations, too, have a
194. Id. at 830.
195. Id. at 833 n.2 ("So long as the Commission could not have deprived the prior
owners of the easement without compensating them, the prior owners must be understood
to have transferred their full property rights in conveying the lot.") While it may be said
that Nollan applies only to physical takings, the Court applied that rule in Palazzolo.
Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 628-29.
196. Eagle, supra note 39, at 560-61.
197. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 833 n.2.
198. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 629.
199. Not all takings claims are transferable. See supra note 30.
200. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
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right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use and
value of land.2°'
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, wrote that the post-
enactment acquisition of title should have "no bearing" upon whether
or not there was a taking.22 He noted that the investment-backed
expectations that are taken into account in a takings analysis do not
include the notice of a regulatory scheme that was in fact so
burdensome as to be unconstitutional.
20 3
But no other members of the Court joined Justice Scalia in his
concurrence. Justice O'Connor specifically took exception to Justice
Scalia's view that the post-enactment acquisition would never prevent
a takings claim. 24  Her view was merely that it was error for the
Rhode Island Supreme Court to raise the issue of post-enactment
acquisition to "dispositive status," but that it was still a factor for
consideration.2 5
A. Justifications of Transferability
There are several justifications for the rule that the post-
enactment acquisition of title does not bar a takings claim: 06 (1) the
rule is required so as not to discriminate against older landowners or
those with fewer resources; (2) the rule is consistent with the notion
that all property interests are transferred by sale; (3) the rule
encourages the alienability of land; (4) the rule allows future
generations to challenge regulations; and (5) the rule prevents the
arbitrary expiration of takings claims.0 7
The first of these justifications is that a current owner may not
live long enough to litigate a takings claim, and the claim would
201. Id. at 627.
202. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 635 n.* (O'Connor, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[I]t would be just as much error to expunge
[the] consideration [of transferability] from the takings inquiry as it would be to accord it
exclusive significance.").
206. This Comment does not discuss what is, perhaps, the most straightforward issue
regarding the transferability of takings claims: the actual intent of the parties. In most
situations, the parties to a contract do not specify whether any takings claims are to be
transferred to the new owner. The arguments discussed in this Comment deal with the
public policy of whether transferability is or is not consistent with Fifth Amendment
protection, regardless of, or in fact despite, the intention of the parties in any given
transaction. For a discussion of a proper default rule in cases in which the parties do not
specify, see Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 11-12. But see supra note 30 (indicating that
some takings claims are not transferable).
207. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 609.
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
otherwise expire on her death. A takings claim, like any claim,
cannot be brought until that claim is ripe.2"8 And in the case of
property regulations, that ripeness is not achieved until governing
authorities reach a "final decision" on the permitted use of the land.2"9
In Palazzolo, a final decision was not reached for twenty-three years
after the first proposal and even then, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court believed that the claim was not yet ripe.210 Many landowners
may be limited in their pursuit of a development proposal for twenty-
three years by age, finances, interest, or a variety of other reasons.
The effort and expense of pursuing a takings claim, in addition to the
development proposal process, may simply be beyond the capacity of
many landowners. 21   Limiting transferability in this way would
certainly cut against the elderly and those with limited resources. 212
Limiting takings claims to the young and well-financed, the Court in
Palazzolo held, is simply "too blunt an instrument '213 to be wielded
against this constitutional guarantee.
A second justification for transferability is that it is an inherent
part of the nature of property rights. It has often been said that the
right to property is actually "a 'bundle of rights' that may be
exercised" with respect to that property.2 4 Such rights include the
right to possession, the right to use, the right to transfer one's
interests, and the right to exclude others.215 One of those rights, in
particular, is the right to make a takings claim against the government
for any unconstitutional encroachments the government makes on the
land.216 Advocates of the non-transferability rule would essentially
give the landowner a choice as to which of two rights inherent in their
property they would like to keep: the right to alienate the property or
the right to make a takings claim against the government. But it is
208. Id. at 618.
209. Id. (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).
210. Palazzolo v. State ex rel Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000), affd in part, rev'd
in part, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
211. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 609. Notice that Palazzolo's first proposal was submitted in
1962. As of the date of this Comment-forty years later-the permissible uses of the
property are still unknown. See supra note 24.
212. Id. at 628.
213. Id.
214. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 509 (Cal. 1990) (Monk, J.,
dissenting); see also United States v. Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (referring to
property rights as a "group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical
thing"); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 57 at 80 (referring to property as a "bundle"
of rights).
215. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 57, at 80.
216. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627.
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precisely this sort of uncompensated appropriation of rights against
which the Takings Clause is meant to guard.217
Third, limiting the transferability of takings claims would hinder
the alienability of land, reducing the productivity of property. Such a
rule, if nothing else, would restrain the real estate markets. As an
example, suppose that A owns land that is worth $100 to him, but is
worth $150 to B. The efficient use of the land would be for A to sell it
to B, thereby realizing a social and financial benefit of $50, less
transaction costs. If, however, any takings claim is automatically
barred by the passage of title, then it can only be litigated so long as
the property is still owned by A. This results in a disincentive to sell
the property and the property will be kept in a use that is less socially
desirable.218
Further, the non-transferability rule creates a general systemic
disincentive to challenge government takings. Suppose, to continue
the above example, that B has far greater resources, ability, or
interest in challenging the takings claim than does A, but B also
knows that once he acquires the property, he will be prevented by law
from challenging the taking. B will be in a quandary: if he does not
acquire the property, he will have no monetary incentive to challenge
the claim; if he does acquire the property, he will be prevented by law
from doing so. Thus, the non-transferability rule would introduce a
general bias into the system whereby takings claims will not be
litigated by those with the most interest, skill, or resources. This
disadvantages the citizens who do challenge government action.
A fourth justification for transferability is that future generations
should have the right to challenge unreasonable limitations on the use
and value of land. Based upon the principle of "one person, one
vote, ' 219 the United States is a country that believes in the right of
every person to have a say in government. Our country also believes
that people should be able to govern themselves and not be bound by
erroneous decisions made in the past. Thus, new generations should
be able to challenge existing law. If claims were not transferable,
217. Id. at 628 ("[A] State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public
property without compensation." (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980))).
218. It is less socially desirable because the property and money is not in the hands of
those who value it most. This analogy is taken from the Institute for Justice amicus curae
brief. See Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 7 n.2.
219. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963).
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states could, in effect, transform a new regulation into a "background
principle" of law that would be essentially unchallengeable.22 °
A fifth justification for transferability is that non-transferability is
discriminatory. As an example, suppose that there are two identical
parcels of land adjacent to one another, parcel C (owned by Cathy)
and parcel D (owned by Doug). Suppose that one day, the
government decides to prevent, unconstitutionally, any further
development on both of their lots. Further, suppose that shortly after
the regulation is imposed, Cathy dies and her land passes to her
daughter, Elizabeth. Without transferability of takings claims, Doug
would be allowed to challenge the regulation, but Elizabeth would
not, as her acquisition of the property was after the passing of the
regulation. Such arbitrary results should have no place in takings
jurisprudence.221
While six justices in Palazzolo agreed that the post-enactment
acquisition does not automatically bar a takings claim, it is not clear
that a majority of the Court believes that it would never prevent a
claim.222 No justice joined Justice Scalia in his concurrence, which
stated that post-enactment acquisition would never bar a claim.223
Additionally, Justice O'Connor wrote a separate concurrence
indicating that the time of acquisition should always be a factor to be
considered, but that it should not be dispositive.2 24 It is not clear,
however, the extent to which Justice O'Connor would apply the
principle of transferability. She notes that it is part of the Penn
Central analysis,225 but Penn Central does not apply to total regulatory
takings or to physical takings. Thus, at most, transferability becomes
an issue only in partial regulatory takings. While post-enactment
acquisition will never prevent a claim, it may weigh in the analysis of
whether a partial taking occurred.
220. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626.
221. Id. at 630 ("A regulation or common-law rule [that would prevent a takings claim]
cannot be a background principle for some owners but not for others."). This principle
should apply to voluntary transfers as well as involuntary ones. If it does not, the state
would be securing a windfall for itself. Id. at 627.
222. Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas clearly support the proposition. Id. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion,
but specifically agreed with the transferability principle in some circumstances. Id. at 654-
55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor would not "expunge" the issue of
transferability from the analysis. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 637 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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B. Criticisms of Transferability of Takings Claims
1. No Standing
The first criticism of the transferability of takings claims is that
the new owner of property that was previously subject to a taking
simply lacks standing to bring the claim.26  A taking, according to
Justice Stevens in his dissent in Palazzolo, is a "discrete event"2 27 that
injures the particular owner at that particular time. Whoever owns
the land at another time is simply irrelevant. 22  Arguably, a future
owner has no cognizable injury that deserves compensation because
nothing was taken from her. Likening a taking to adverse possession,
Justice Stevens notes that "[a] new owner may maintain an ejectment
action against a trespasser who has lodged himself in the owner's
orchard but surely could not recover damages for fruit a trespasser
spirited from the orchard before he acquired the property. 229
2. Windfalls/Unfairness
Another criticism of the transferability of takings claims is that
such transferability may, in some circumstances, result in a windfall to
subsequent owners who are able to make a takings claim on property
that the seller of the property did not realize was possible.230  As
Justice O'Connor noted in Palazzolo, "if existing regulations do
nothing to inform the analysis, then some property owners may reap
windfalls and an important indicium of fairness is lost. '231 In other
words, if the existence of restrictions on property at the time of
226. Id. at 641-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). In eminent
domain cases, a taking is usually a "discrete event," meaning that the new owner has no
standing to make a claim. See supra note 30. In regulatory takings cases, however, the
taking is less often a discrete event, as the ripeness of the claim can take decades. For a
discussion of ripeness in Palazzolo, see supra notes 9-21 . The requisite ripeness of a
constitutional takings claim has two components. First, the plaintiff must receive a final
determination regarding the permissible use of the property. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 618.
Second, the plaintiff must be denied relief in state court. Williamson County Reg'l
Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnston City, 473 U.S. 172, 194 (1985). Only
then may the claim be brought in federal court. For a further discussion of these
requirements, see, e.g., Michael M. Berger, Supreme Bait & Switch: The Ripeness Ruse in
Regulatory Takings, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 99, 103 (2000) (discussing the ripeness issue
and its effect on landowners); Thomas E. Roberts, Ripeness and Forum Selection in Fifth
Amendment Takings Litigation, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 37, 39 (1995) (noting the
confusion that generally exists as to the issue).
227. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 644 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
228. Id. at 641-42 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
229. Id. at 642 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
230. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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transfer does not prevent a new owner from challenging those
restrictions, some purchasers of property will secure windfalls. Those
new owners will be able to challenge regulations that everyone,
perhaps including the seller of the property, thought were valid and
thereby be able to purchase more valuable property for a lesser
consideration. As Justice Scalia notes in his concurrence in
Palazzolo:
The polar horrible, presumably, is the situation in which a
sharp real estate developer, realizing (or indeed, simply
gambling on) the unconstitutional excessiveness of a
development restriction that a naive landowner assumes to
be valid, purchases property at what it would be worth
subject to the restriction, and then develops it to its full
value (or resells it at its full value) after getting the
unconstitutional restriction invalidated.232
But, such a profit or windfall is no more than that which occurs
everyday in the financial markets, where the "knowledgeable (or the
venturesome) profit at the expense of the ignorant (or the risk
averse)." '233 Indeed, the Supreme Court, in discussing the law dealing
with insider trading in the stock markets, has specifically "rejected the
notion that insider trading regulation is premised on the quest for all
investors to have the same access to information." '234 Thus, "there are
many instances in which the law condones a party's purchasing or
selling shares [and presumably the profit that results] on the basis of
information not available to the other investors." '235 There is no
reason why the law of real property should be any different; it should
not be concerned with one party getting a better deal through greater
knowledge or courage.
In fact, the law of real property is not any different. For years,
speculators have purchased property containing clouded titles with
the belief that they can secure a profit on the transaction if they are
232. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring).
233. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
234. JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS 273 (1997) (citing Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222, 233-34 (1980)).
235. Id. The primary justification for the laws prohibiting insider trading is that they
are designed to preserve the integrity of American capital markets. Other justifications
include the fact that they speed the release of information from companies and are in
accord with fundamental ideas of fairness. Id. at 273-74. But insider trading laws do not
go so far as to create a "parity-of-information" rule. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 233 (1980). Thus, someone who, by study or diligence, improves his odds in the
market, is not, without more, guilty of violating insider trading laws. Likewise, one who,
by study or diligence, realizes the probability of a successful takings claim in regards to
property should not be prohibited from profiting from that advantage.
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able to clear the title through appropriate legal means.236 If this sort
of speculation is permitted, the essential difference between a
clouded title and a disputed takings claim is negligible.
As demonstrated by the above cases, the Supreme Court does
not often find a taking.237 Thus, whoever purchases the land with
burdensome regulations accepts the risk that he will purchase the
land and litigate the claim for many years, only to be defeated. In
those instances where a court finds a taking and awards compensation
to the new owner, the award should be considered the deserved
reward for taking the risk of litigating a claim with the chance that a
taking may not be found.
Finally, as Justice Scalia notes in Palazzolo, there is more than
one windfall at issue in such cases.23 If transferability is not allowed,
there will still be a windfall, but one that instead goes to the
government.239 Although some may characterize a windfall as unfair,
a windfall inuring to the government seems less fair than one inuring
to a risk-taking purchaser.240
CONCLUSION
A. Post-Palazzolo
The current unfairness in takings law is demonstrated by the
recent case of Rith Energy v. United States,241 which was reheard in
light of and to resolve any conflict with the Supreme Court's decision
in Palazzolo.2 2 In Rith, the plaintiff purchased a mining lease in
Tennessee. After mining for a period of time and extracting only
nine percent of the coal from the site, the Department of the Interior
prohibited all future mining on the leased land and the plaintiff sued
for compensation, claiming a taking of the remaining ninety-one
percent.243  Predictably, the government's defenses were the
partial/total dichotomy and the concept of reasonable investment-
236. Patrick J. Rohan, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 67.07 (Michael Allen Wolf ed.,
2002).
237. See also Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts,
48 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (1995) (noting that courts "only rarely find regulatory takings").
238. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 636-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
239. Id. (Scalia J., concurring).
240. In fact, the state may not secure a windfall for itself in this manner. See supra note
217.
241. 270 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2660 (U.S. 2002).
242. Id. at 1348.
243. Id. at 1349.
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backed expectations.2" Despite the fact that over ninety percent of
the value of the leased land was eliminated, the court concluded that
it was not a "categorical" taking and, thus, was not compensable.245
Further, the court found that plaintiff could have had no investment-
backed expectations that the government would not intrude at some
point and prohibit any further mining because mining is a "highly
regulated industry. 246
The plaintiff, Rith Energy, had not suffered a total taking
because it had already extracted nine percent of the coal from the
land. However, if under Palazzolo, Rith Energy's takings claim is
transferable, Rith Energy could transfer the remainder of their lease
to a new entity, who would then suffer a total-and hence,
compensable-taking. 247  Thus, in the future, companies like Rith
Energy should be able to structure their claims in order to avoid the
partial/total dichotomy and ensure just compensation.
The Court in Rith next addressed investment-backed
expectations and noted that its "role ... in regulatory takings cases is
well settled. '248  This is only true, however, for partial regulatory
takings. As mentioned above, Palazzolo's transferability principle
can enable claims such as Rith Energy's to become total regulatory
takings by selective transfers, thus creating "categorical takings,"
which are fully compensable and do not include investment-backed
expectations in their analysis. Thus, Palazzolo's principle of
transferability, although acknowledged by the Rith court,249 provides a
means to escape the partial/total dichotomy and is incompatible with
the investment-backed expectations analysis used by the court.
B. A New Theory of Just Compensation
Takings Clause jurisprudence is in need of repair. One simple
rule should replace the partial/total dichotomy: the more the
government takes, the more it pays, subject to the nuisance defense
244. The court also mentioned the defense of public nuisance which, if proven, would
be an independent and sufficient defense. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
This Comment analyzes Rith only for its defenses of the partial/total dichotomy and
investment-backed expectations.
245. Rith, 270 F.3d at 1349. The court held that the ninety-one percent reduction in
value was not a total taking, id., and that Rith Energy reduced investment-backed
expectations due to regulations and uncertainty of obtaining permits, id. at 1351.
246. Id. at 1350.
247. And if an after-the-fact transfer would be objectionable, certainly a before-the-
fact one would not be problematic.
248. Rith, 270 F.3d at 1350.
249. Id. at 1349.
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from Lucas250 and the reciprocity of advantage defense from Penn
Central.251
The partial/total dichotomy is problematic because it leads to
uncompensated deprivation of property that is inconsistent with the
purposes of the Fifth Amendment and the investment-backed
expectations defense has become a means for the government to
immunize future regulations from takings scrutiny.2  The current
Takings Clause jurisprudence "tends to strip the Clause of its
potential for fulfilling the framers' likely purposes '253 of protection of
private property and restraint on government. Fortunately, in
Palazzolo, the court acknowledged the transferability of takings
claims as an inherent part of property rights. In doing so, the Court
may have signaled the beginning of the end for such doctrines of
property rights, for transferability undermines those doctrines.
A just application of the Takings Clause requires overruling the
partial/total dichotomy. As Professor Epstein has argued, "the Lucas
rules for total takings [should be] extended to partial takings. '254 The
Fifth Amendment states that what is taken must be compensated. 5
There is no justification for not compensating property owners when
real and substantial loss is inflicted on them and their property for the
greater public good.256 Eliminating this dichotomy would solve the
denominator problem and much of the difficulty and uncertainty in
takings law.
While the proposed rule has justification, there is strong
opposition. The first and "[m]ost obvious [problem] is the cost of
calculating and administering compensation, which would tend to
sink many a beneficent statute. ' 257 This fear is unfounded. First, the
reciprocity of advantage will be a difficult hurdle for many plaintiffs
to overcome. They will need to show that no corresponding benefit is
created in their property that negates the diminution in value of
250. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
251. Reciprocity of advantage is the concept that some regulations or takings may add
value to property and that this should be considered in the takings calculus. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 139-40 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
252. Dist. Intown Props. Ltd. v. D.C., 198 F.3d 874, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Williams, J.,
concurring).
253. Id. (Williams, J., concurring). "[M]odern interpretation of the Takings Clause ...
impairs its role as a disincentive to wasteful government activities." Id. at 885 (Williams,
J., concurring).
254. Amicus Brief, supra note 25, at 5.
255. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
256. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
257. Dist. Intown, 198 F.3d at 885 (Williams, J., concurring).
20021
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
which they complain.258 Second, the plaintiffs will need to show that
the nuisance exception from Lucas does not apply. In other words,
the plaintiffs must show that the restrictions on their property were
not restrictions that inhered in their title and that the government
could rightly prohibit under its police power. If the plaintiff
overcomes these hurdles, then the government likely has instituted a
burdensome regulation that has more than a trifling effect on the
plaintiff's property. In such a situation, the Takings Clause speaks
loud and clear: compensation is due.259
A more fundamental reason why many oppose the elimination of
the partial/total dichotomy is because it arguably "would lead to an
exponential expansion of regulatory taking claims ... while placing
our natural environment [and other worthwhile programs] at
exceptional risk. '26°  But the real worry is not about giving
compensation; instead, it is that compensation will cause a
reevaluation of whether or not those goods (often environmental
protection measures) being purchased are in fact worth what is being
paid for them. If environmental and other programs are worth the
money spent, then no diminution will occur. It is only if society
concludes that the programs are not worth their cost that there will be
a reduction. Thus, there is no reason not to compensate those whose
property is taken-whatever that level of deprivation may be.261
Takings jurisprudence is in need of a reevaluation. When the
most important constitutional protection for property owners awards
full compensation for a trifling interference such as in Loretto,262 yet
ignores a ninety percent diminution in value, such as in Rith,263
obviously substance has taken a back seat to form. Fortunately, the
explicit upholding of transferability of takings claims in Palazzolo is a
step in the right direction. Not only does it instill fairness in the long
and laborious process of challenging takings claims,26 it cuts away at
the partial/total dichotomy and thereby the use of investment-backed
expectations as a means of denying rightful compensation. In this
258. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
259. But see supra note 95 (discussing the intent of the Framers of the Constitution and
the Takings Clause).
260. Coletta, supra note 109, at 22.
261. John E. Fee, Of Parcels and Property, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES,
supra note 30, at 101, 119 ("The relevant issue is not whether ... to preserve natural
environments, but whether individual owners such as Anthony Palazzolo should bear the
heavy expense of doing so .... ).
262. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 241-49 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81
2002] PALAZZOLO V. RHODE ISLAND 431
manner, it helps instill justice and fairness into the calculation and
helps assure that future public burdens will less often be thrust on the
shoulders of individuals like Anthony Palazzolo.
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